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1.   Introduct i on
The nat ure of the relati onshi p bet w een exchange rates and int erest rates duri ng t he 
As i an f i nanci al  cri sis has  been mu c h   debat ed by  t he  Wo r l d  Bank,   t he  I MF   and  t he  US 
Tr easury,   and  has  i m port ant  pol i cy i mp l i cati ons.     Wh i l e t he  I MF   has  argued  t hat   steep 
r i ses i n i nt erest  r ates we r e vi t al  i n stabil i zing As i an exchange r ates,  t he Wo r l d Bank 
posi t i on,   part l y r efl ecti ng t he vi ew s of  i t s f orme r   chief  econom i st  Joseph St i gl i t z,  has 
been t hat   i nt erest  r ate hi kes dest abil i zed t he curr encies f urt her  by i ncreasing t he r i sk 
of bankrupt cy, wh i ch led to furt her l oss of confi dence i n t hese econom i es (see 
St i gl i t z,  1999).     Dr aw ing out   pol i cy l essons f r om  episodes such as t he As i an cri sis i s 
clearl y vi t al  f or  safeguardi ng i nt ernat i onal   f i nanci al  stabil i t y i n t he  f ut ure. 
Thi s paper  aims   at  cont r i but i ng t o t hi s key pol i cy debat e by provi di ng new  em pir i cal 
evidence on wh e t her  hi gher  i nt erest  r ates we r e i n f act  successful   i n defendi ng As i an 
exchange r ates f r om  speculati ve pressures duri ng t he cri sis peri od.   We   i mp r ove upon 
existi ng  studi es i n  t wo   i m port ant  wa y s .   Fi r st,   by  usi ng  a l ong  dat a span we   are able t o 
exam ine t he eff ects of an int erest rate ri se on t he nom i nal  exchange rate duri ng
t r anqui l  peri ods and t o com pare them  w i t h t hose duri ng m ore turbul ent peri ods.
Second,  w e adopt  an appropri ate ident i f i cati on schem e.  Specif i call y,  we  e s t i ma t e a 
bi vari ate V ector  Er r or  Cor r ecti on ( VECM)   m odel   f or  f our  As i an count r i es i n order  t o 
capture the relati onshi p bet w een the exchange rate and the i nt erest r ate. The
i dent i f i cati on of  t he system  i s achieved by t aking i nt o account   t he het eroscedasti cit y 
propert i es of the t i me - s e r i es under invest i gat i on,  fol l ow i ng Sent ana and Fiorenti ni  
( 2001).     Thi s me t hod enables us t o address t he endogenei t y of  i nt erest  r ates,  a t horny 
econom et r i c probl em  under  any cir cum stances,  but   especiall y acute duri ng peri ods of 
speculati ve at t acks. Thi s is in m arked cont r ast to earl i er em pir i cal studi es, mo s t  of 
wh i ch eit her di d not  recogni ze or we r e unabl e to address thi s seri ous econom et r i c 
probl em ,  whi ch can be  a source of  bi ased esti ma t es.
The  r est  of  t he paper  i s organi zed as f ol l ow s.     Secti on 2 bri efl y r eview s t he existi ng 
t heoreti cal and em pi r i cal li t erature, and out l i nes t he m et hodol ogi cal issues w hich a 
r i gorous em pi r i cal analysi s needs to address.  Secti on 3 expl ains t he em pi r i cal
me t hodol ogy used t o i dent i f y t he m odel ,  wh i ch exploi t s the het eroscedasti cit y
propert i es of the seri es.  Secti on 4 gi ves det ail s of the dat a and the equat i ons t o be 2
esti ma t ed.    Secti on 5 presents and di scusses t he em pir i cal  r esult s.    Fi nal l y,   secti on 6 
off ers som e concl udi ng  r em arks.
2.   Li t erature Re v i ew  and  Me t hodol ogi cal  Issues
Exi sti ng  Li t erature
The t r adit i onal  vi ew  on t he relati onshi p bet w een m onetary pol i cy and the exchange 
r ate,  on wh i ch t he I MF   posi t i on i s based,  i s t hat   a t i ght   m onet ary pol i cy str engt hens 
t he exchange rate by sendi ng a si gnal  t hat  t he aut hori t i es are com m it t ed to
ma i nt aini ng a fi xed rate, t hereby i ncreasing capi t al i nfl ow s (Backus and D ri f f i l l ,  
1985).  A  num ber of authors, how ever,  have argued against  the si gnal i ng val ue of a 
m onet ary t i ght ening.O bst f eld (1994),  Dr azen and M asson (1994),  and Bensai d and 
Jeanne ( 1997)  provi de a t heoreti cal  f r am ew ork wh e r e t he pol i cym akers f ace a t r ade-
off   wh e n   peggi ng t he exchange r ate.  The  nat ure of  t he t r ade-off   vari es across m odel s 
but  they al l  have a com m on fl avor.  On  t he one hand,  lett i ng t he exchange rate fl oat  
i mp l i es a f i xed cost  ari sing f r om  t he l oss of  credibi l i t y.   Thi s cost  r efl ects t he f act  t hat  
pol i cym akers have t o abandon t hei r  di sinfl ati on goal  l i nked t o an exchange rate 
anchor.   On   t he  ot her  hand,   t he  cost  of  ma i nt aini ng  t he  peg  i s associated wi t h  eit her  t he 
out put   costs of  an overval ued curr ency,  or  t he excess curr ent  defi cit   r esult i ng f r om  i t ,  
or t he budget ary consequences of t he hi gher i nt erest rates needed to defend t he 
curr ency. Thi s fr am ew ork has been associated w it h sel f -ful f i l l i ng curr ency cri ses 
because the relati ve cost  of defendi ng t he curr ency increases substanti all y duri ng a 
speculati ve att ack,  and pol i cym akers ma y   choose t o abandon t he peg once t he att ack 
occurs.
I n t he case of the A si an fi nanci al cri sis, a num ber of econom i sts, incl udi ng Radel et 
and Sachs (1998),  Fel dst ein (1998),  Fur m an and St i gl i t z (1998) and St i gl i t z (1999),  
argued agai nst  the si gnal i ng val ue of ti ght er m onet ary pol i cy by poi nt i ng out  the 
eff ects of hi gher int erest rates on t he probabi l i t y of bankrupt cy of hi ghl y l everaged 
borr ow ers.    These ma n i f est  t hem sel ves  i n  t he  f orm  of  a l arger  count r y  r i sk prem ium ,   a 
l ow er,   possibl y negat i ve,   expected r eturn t o i nvest ors,  and capit al  f l i ght ,   all   of  wh i ch 
generate dow nw ard pressure on t he exchange rate. The r ol e played by banks'  and 
f i r ms '  bal ance sheets has been analysed by St i gl i t z (1999) in a part i al equi l i bri um  
m odel .   Mo r e r ecentl y,   Ge r t l er  et  al.   ( 2000)  have str essed t he perverse eff ect  of  a t i ght  
m onet ary pol i cy occurr i ng t hrough t he bal ance sheet channel i n t he cont ext of a 3
general equi l i bri um  m odel .  Thi s is essenti all y a sm all  open econom y m acrom odel  
i ncorporati ng “a fi nanci al accelerator ” m echanism  (see also B ernanke and  G ert l er,  
1999).  Thus,  the “revisioni st” view  predicts a “foreign exchange-i nt erest rate Laff er 
curve”. The f oundat i ons of thi s view  have,  how ever,  been cri t i cized by K rugm an 
( 1998),   w ho  argues  t hat   even very  hi gh  i nt erest  r ates mi ght   be  preferable t o  a f r ee f all  
i n t he exchange rate in count r i es w it h a l arge ext ernal  debt  denom i nat ed in foreign 
curr ency.
1
The avail able em pir i cal evidence i s m ixed.  Empi r i cal studi es based on panel  dat a 
analysi s tend t o support  the revisioni st vi ew , wh i l e studi es based  on V A R m odel  
specif i cati ons provi de confl i cti ng result s. Go l dfajn and G upt a (1999a, b),  usi ng
m ont hl y dat a fr om  80 count r i es coveri ng t he peri od of 1980-98,  f i nd t hat  t he
probabi l i t y of curr ency appreciati on condi t i onal  on a t i ght  m onet ary pol i cy is m uch 
l ower   i n count r i es ( such as t he t hose i n Eas t   As i a)  wi t h a w eak banki ng sector.   Kr aay 
( 1999) exam ines factors determi ni ng w het her or not  defences of a fi xed peg agai nst  
speculati ve  att ack succeed.  Us i ng  mo n t hl y  observat i ons,   he  i nst r um ent s f or  t he  pol i cy 
endogenei t y of  i nt erest  r ates,  and f i nds,   i n a sam ple of  75 devel oped and devel opi ng 
count r i es,  t hat   a t i ght   m onet ary  pol i cy does  not   i ncrease t he  l i kel i hood  of  a successful  
defense.  Fur ma n   and  St i gl i t z ( 1998)  exam ine  ni ne  em ergi ng  ma r ket s wi t h  episodes  of 
t em porari l y hi gh i nt erest rates. Us i ng si mp l e regression analysi s, they fi nd t hat  bot h 
t he m agni t ude and durati on of such int erest rate hikes are associated w it h exchange 
r ate depreciati on.  
De k l e et  al  ( 1998),   usi ng hi gh-fr equency ( w eekly)  dat a,  f i nd t hat  in t he case of  Ko r ea 
t he i ncrease i n t he i nt erest  r ate di f f erenti al  hel ped t o appreciate t he Ko r ean W on.   The 
analysi s of  Ba s ur t o  and  Go s h   ( 2000),   based  on  m ont hl y  dat a f or  I ndonesi a,  Ko r ea and 
Thai l and,  provi des l i t t l e evidence t hat  hi gher real int erest rat es result ed in a hi gher 
r i sk prem ium ,  wh i l st t hey appear t o be associ ated w it h an appreciati on of t he
curr ency. Tanner’ s (1999) em pir i cal study,  wh i ch uses m ont hl y dat a, focuses on an 
i ndex of the exchange m arket  pressure, wh i ch is m easured by t he sum  of exchange
1 The f ocus of thi s paper is on t he i nt erest rate-exchange rate relati onshi p.  Ot her im port ant m onet ary 
pol i cy i ssues i n  t he  aft erma t h  of  curr ency cri ses are evaluat i ng  wh e t her  t he  r eal  exchange r ate ( RER)  
has overshot  and has becom e underval ued w i t h respect to i t s long- r un equi l i bri um ;  wh e t her nom i nal  
curr ency appreciati on or hi gher dom est i c infl ati on shoul d be used as a m eans to bri ng i t  back to 4
r ate depreciati on and r eserve out f l ow s.   Exami ni ng i ndi vi dual   and pool ed esti ma t es of 
a VAR  m odel   esti ma t ed f or  Br azil ,   Chi l e,  Me x i co,  I ndonesi a,  Ko r ea and  Thai l and,   t he 
author  ( op.   cit . )   f i nds t hat   a cont r acti onary m onet ary pol i cy hel ps t o r educe exchange
r ate ma r ket   pressure. 
On  t he ot her hand,  t he V A R m odel  esti ma t i on and i mp u l se response analysi s of
Go l dfajn and Ba i g ( 1998),   based on dai l y dat a,  provi de evidence of  a perverse eff ect 
of a ti ght  m onet ary pol i cy on t he exchange rate in Thai l and,  Indonesi a,  Phi l i ppi nes,  
Ko r ea and Ma l aysia.  G oul d and Ka mi n ( 1999)  use Gr anger  causali t y t est  on w eekly 
observat i ons on i nt erest and exchange rates for six count r i es: I ndonesi a, Ko r ea,
Ma l aysia, Phi l i ppi nes,  Thai l and and M exi co. They f i nd t hat  duri ng fi nanci al cri ses 
exchange rates are not  signi f i cantl y aff ected in any of the count r i es exam ined by 
changes in i nt erest rates. A s i mi l ar fi ndi ng i s report ed in O hno,  Shi r ono and Si sly 
( 1999),   w ho  appl y  t he  Toda  and  Ya ma mo t o  ( 1995)  me t hodol ogy  ( wh i ch all ow s  t o  t est
Gr anger causali t y regardl ess of the order of int egrati on of the t i me  s e r i es) to dai l y 
observat i ons on i nt erest rates and exchange rates in Thai l and,  Ko r ea, Indonesi a, 
Phi l i ppi nes,   Ma l aysia,  Tai wa n   and  Si ngapore.      Fi nal l y,   t he  evidence  i n  Cho  and  We s t  
( 2001),  w ho sol ve t he i dent i f i cati on probl em  by proposi ng a m et hodol ogy m appi ng 
second m om ent s to t he poi nt  esti ma t es of the relevant coeff i cients using st r uct ural 
r estr i cti ons,   i s mi xed.     Specif i call y,   t hei r   ma i n  f i ndi ng  i s t hat   an exogenous  i ncrease i n 
i nt erest  r ates l ed t o exchange r ate appreciati on i n Ko r ea and t he Phi l i ppi nes,   and t o a 
depreciati on i n Thai l and.   Ho we v e r ,   as t he authors r ecogni ze,  t he confi dence i nt erval s 
around t he poi nt   esti ma t es are very l arge,   suggest i ng a cauti ous i nt erpretati on of  t hei r
f i ndi ngs.
Me t hodol ogi cal  I ssues
Thr ee im port ant issues need to be addressed by an em pi r i cal study of the eff ects of 
m onet ary  pol i cy on  exchange r ates.      The  f i r st  one  r elates t o  t he  l i kel y  endogenei t y  of 
m onet ary pol i cy, the second t o t he m easurem ent of the m onet ary pol i cy stance, and 
t he t hi r d t o t he possi bi l i t y of regime  s wi t ches.  W e di scuss each of t hem  i n t he 
r em ainder  of  t hi s secti on.
equi l i bri um ;   and  f i nal l y,   t he  costs of  r aising  i nt erest  r ates  i n  t erms   of  out put   l osses and  f i nanci al  system  
f r agil i t y  ( see Go l dfajn  and  Ba i g,   1998).5
Per haps t he m ost  i m port ant em pir i cal chall enge i s the i dent i f i cati on of m onet ary
pol i cy exogenous shocks as di st i nct  fr om  m onet ary pol i cy acti ons (see also K raay, 
1999
2) .     Pol i cy ma k e r s’  acti ons  t o  som e extent  r espond  t o  curr ent  devel opm ent s i n  t he 
econom y,   such as a speculati ve  att ack on  t he  curr ency.  Thi s r esponse  ma y   be  captured 
by a pol i cy r eacti on f unct i on and i s di sti nct   f r om  exogenous pol i cy shocks,   wh i ch are 
defi ned as devi ati ons of  t he authori t i es’  behavi or    f r om  t hei r   r ul e.  I n ot her  wo r ds,   an 
i dent i f i cati on schem e i s needed to sol ve t he si mu l t aneit y probl em  betw een poli cy 
i nst r um ent s and ot her endogenous vari ables, such as exchange rates, t o w hi ch
m onet ary  pol i cy system ati call y  r eacts.  Past   em pir i cal  studi es of  t he  As i an cri sis based 
on V A R  analysi s do not  expl i cit l y recogni ze the si mu l t aneous feedback betw een
exchange rates and int erest rates. By cont r ast,  in t he present paper we  a r e able to 
i dent i f y  t he  eff ects of  an i nt erest  r ates r i se on  t he  exchange r ate by  t aking  i nt o  account 
t he het eroscedasti cit y propert y of the t i me  s e r i es under invest i gat i on,  fol l ow i ng t he 
me t hod  put   f orwa r d  by  Sent ana and  Fi orenti ni   ( 2001).
A ccordi ng t o G ol dfain and Bai g (1998),  the ex-ant e real int erest rate is the m ost  
appropri ate m easure of t he t i ght ness or l ooseness of m onet ary pol i cy
3.  Ho we v e r ,  
wh i l e t hi s ma y   i n  pri nci pl e be  a val i d  econom i c argum ent ,   i n  practi ce t here are t horny
m easurem ent issues associated w it h obt aini ng accurate m easures of the real rate of 
i nt erest.  B ecause infl ati on expect ati ons generall y are not  observed di r ectl y,  t hi s
f r equent l y l eads t o usi ng ex-post  m easures of  t he r eal  i nt erest  r ate,  by usi ng r eali sed
r ather  t han expected i nfl ati on.   Un f ort unat ely,   as G oul d and Ka mi n ( 1999)  poi nt   out ,  
wh i l e actual  infl ati on m ay be an adequat e proxy for infl ati on expect ati ons duri ng 
t r anqui l  peri ods,  i t  m ay di verge consi derably fr om  i nfl ati on expect ati ons duri ng
f i nanci al cri ses that  i nvol ve sharp depreciati ons of t he exchange rate. Such
depreciati ons  ma y   cause short   bursts of  i nfl ati on  t hat   l ead t o  ex-post   r eal  i nt erest  r ates 
f all i ng or even tem porari l y becom i ng negat i ve,  even though nom i nal  int erest rates 
m ay have been raised subst anti all y.  Thus,  the result s of studi es that  rely on ex-post
m easures of t he real i nt erest r ate as indi cators of t he m onet ary st ance m ay be
mi sleading.   We ,   t herefore,  ut i l i se t he nom i nal   i nt erest  r ate i n our  esti ma t i ons,   wh i ch 
2  T his author uses an inst r um ent al vari able techni que by em pl oyi ng changes i n foreign reserves and 
changes in t he count r y borr ow i ng fr om  t he IMF  a s  i nst r um ent s.  Ho we v e r ,  these are li kel y t o be 
i mp e r f ect  i nst r um ent s,  since  t hey  are  unl i kel y  t o  be  exogenous  duri ng  speculati ve  att acks.
3 Som e aut hors (e.g.  Tanner,  1999;  Ba s ur t o and G hosh,  2000),  also suggest  usi ng ot her m onet ary 
i ndi cators  t o  capture  t he  stance  of  m onet ary  pol i cy,  such as  foreign  r eserves  and  credit   aggregates. 6
we  b e l i eve is the m ost accurate and w idel y avail able indi cator of t he st ance of
m onet ary  pol i cy. 
Fi nal l y,   t he possibi l i t y of  a s y mme t r i es also needs t o be t aken i nt o account ,   as Kr aay 
( 1999)  poi nt s out .   I n part i cular,   r egime   sw it ches are l i kel y t o occur  over  l onger  t i me  
peri ods.   Wh i l st  t he em pir i cal  studi es r eview ed above f ocus on t he cri sis peri od onl y,  
w e use a long dat a span, wh i ch enables us to com pare the relati onshi p bet we e n
exchange rates and int erest rates in t r anqui l  and t urbul ent peri ods.   W e, therefore, 
m odel  pol i cy shif t s by defi ni ng appropri ate  d u mmi es, wh i ch are ful l y descri bed i n 
Secti on  4.
3.   Empi rical  Me t hodol ogy:  Identi f i cati on  t hrough  He t eroscedasti cit y
Gi ven t he n×1 vect or of endogenous vari ables Zt,  consi der the st r uct ural VAR o f  
order  p:
t t t Z L B AZ e + = −1 ) (( 1)
wh e r e B (L)  is a pol ynom i al in t he l ag operator,  A i s the n×n m at r i x w hi ch captures 
t he cont em poraneous int eracti on bet w een the vari ables incl uded i n Z t,   and εt is the 
vector of str uct ural innovat i ons.  It  is usual l y assum ed t hat  the st r uct ural innovat i ons 
are uncondi t i onal l y and condi t i onal l y ort hogonal .  Ther efore bot h t he uncondi t i onal  
covari ance ma t r i x E( εt ε' t)   =  Γ  and  t he  condi t i onal   covari ance ma t r i x    Et-1( εt ε' t)   =  Γt  are 
di agonal .  Fur t hermo r e, t he uncondi t i onal  vari ance of t he st r uct ural i nnovat i ons i s 
norma l i sed t o uni t y,   and,   consequent l y,   E( εt ε' t)   =  I ,   wh e r e I   i s an i dent i t y ma t r i x.   The 
corr espondi ng  r educed f orm  of  t he  m odel   i n  ( 1)  i s:
t t t Z L C Z n + = −1 ) (( 2)
The uncondi t i onal  and condi t i onal  covari ance m atr i ces of t he reduced form
i nnovat i ons νt are E(νtν' t)   = Σ,  and Et-1( νtν' t)   = Σt,  respecti vel y.  If  the residual s are
hom oscedast i c, t hen Σt = Σ,  wh e r eas, under condi t i onal  het eroscedasti cit y,  Σt≠Σ .
U nder  hom oscedast i cit y,   t here exists a t i me   i nvari ant  ort hogonal   t r ansforma t i ons  such 
t hat  Aνt=εt is observat i onal l y equi val ent to A
*νt= ε
*
t,  wh e r e A
* = ( Q
-1) ' A,εt
* = Qεt,7
and Q  i s an arbi t r ary n ×n ort hogonal  ma t r i x.  The observat i onal  equi val ence occurs 
since bot h εt  and t he corr espondi ng ort hogonal   r ot ated i nnovat i ons ε
*
t  i mp l y t hat   Σ  = 
A
-1( A




-1' .  I n order t o (exactl y) i dent i f y t he m at r i x A ,  w e need n
2
r estr i cti ons.  I t  i s custom ary t o i m pose,  as a set of i dent i f yi ng restr i cti ons,  t he
norma l i sati on t o uni t y of t he el em ents of ma i n di agonal  of Γ,  and t o assum e
ort hogonal  str uct ural innovat i ons.  Thi s provi des a set of n(n+1)/ 2 restr i cti ons and,  
t herefore,  i t   i s not   suff i cient  t o i dent i f y t he param eters. 
Tr adit i onal  VAR mo d e l s of m onet ary pol i cy are based on Bernanke’s (1986)
me t hodol ogy w hi ch provi des t he rem aini ng n(n+1)/ 2 i dent i f yi ng restr i cti ons by
i m posi ng a recursive st r uct ure on t he i m pact mu l t i pl i er ma t r i x A .  Ho we v e r ,  t hi s 
i dent i f yi ng schem e,  wh i ch is rati onal i zed in t erms  o f  i nforma t i onal  del ays in t he 
m onet ary aut hori t i es feedback rul es, is hard t o j ust i f y i n open econom i es, wh e r e 
mu t ual   cont em poraneous f eedback bet w een i nt erest  r ates and exchange r ates ma y   be 
mo r e plausibl e. Sm et s (1996,  1997) and K i m  and Roubi ni  (2000) propose a non-
r ecursive  i dent i f yi ng  schem e f or  a VAR  i ncl udi ng  a f ew  other  vari ables i n  addi t i on  t o 
i nt erest  and exchange r ates.  Ba gl i ano and Faver o ( 1999)  use a non-V A R m easure of 
m onet ary pol i cy shocks t o expl i cit l y address the i dent i f i cati on probl em  ari sing fr om  
t he simu l t aneit y of  i nt erest  r ates and exchange r ates.  They   consi der  t he US- Ge r ma n y
case, and deri ve a di r ect m easure of Ge r m an m onet ary pol i cy shocks by usi ng
i nforma t i on  extr acted f r om   f i nanci al  ma r ket s. 
I n t hi s paper we  f ol l ow  t he suggest i ons of Sent ana and Fiorenti ni  (2001)
4,   wh i ch 
enable us t o i dent i f y a bi vari ate VECM  m odel   i ncl udi ng i nt erest  r ates and exchange 
r ates onl y  by  consi deri ng  t he  t i me - v a r yi ng  condi t i onal   vari ances propert i es of  t he  t wo  
f i nanci al seri es. U nder condi t i onal  het eroscedasti cit y,  Aνt=εt  is not  observat i onal l y 
equi val ent t o A t
*νt=ε
*
t,wh e r eA t
*=( Q
- 1) ' Γt
- 1/ 2




t εt.  Ob s e r vat i onal
equi val ence does not  occur since, unl i ke i n t he hom oscedast i c case, the ort hogonal  
r ot ati ons of the vect or of str uct ural innovat i ons εt are dif f erent in each ti me  p e r i od,  
gi ven t hat  the condi t i onal  covari ance m atr i x Γt,  and,  consequent l y,  A t
* ,  are ti me -
varyi ng    ( f or  det ail s,  see Sent ana and  Fi orenti ni ,   2001).
4  Ri gobon  ( 2000)  provi des  an alt ernat i ve  i dent i f i cati on  schem e based  on  het eroscedasti cit y.   See Ki ng,  
Sent ana, W adhw ani  (1994) and N orm andi n and Phaneuf (1997) for em pir i cal appl i cati ons of t he
Sent ana-Fi orenti ni   approach.8
4.   Da t a  and  Empi rical  Mo d e l
The  analysi s wa s   carr i ed out   usi ng m ont hl y dat a f or  t he peri od 1991: 2-2001: 10.  The
count r i es under  i nvest i gat i on  are t hose  wh i ch experi enced a t em porary  and  signi f i cant 
m onet ary pol i cy t i ght ening duri ng t he As i an f i nanci al  cri sis:  Thai l and,   Sout h Ko r ea, 
I ndonesi a and t he Phi l i ppi nes.   The  bi l ateral  nom i nal   exchange r ate seri es are defi ned 
as uni t s of  dom est i c curr ency per  US  dol l ar.   The  dom est i c i nt erest  r ate seri es used  are 
t he K orean call  overni ght  rate, the Indonesi an int erbank cal l  rate, the Phi l i ppi nes 
i nt erbank call   l oan r ate,  and t he Thai   r epo r ate,  wh i ch are t he r elevant  pol i cy i nt erest 
r ates i n each case.  The US f ederal  f unds r ate i s used as t he f oreign i nt erest  r ate.  Al l  
seri es we r e obt ained  f r om   Da t astr eam . 
Som e  uni t   r oot   pre-testi ng  analysi s wa s   carr i ed out ,   show i ng  evidence  of  a uni t   r oot   i n 
each seri es.
5 I n  each case t he  condi t i onal   m ean equat i ons  are specif i ed as a VECM:
t
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                  ( 3)
The  t wo   endogenous  vari ables are a proxy  f or  t he  nom i nal   exchange r ate depreciati on 
r ate ( i n percent  val ues),   t hat   i s 100×∆e t,   wh e r e ∆e t is the fi r st-order  di f f erence of  t he 
l og of  t he nom i nal   bi l ateral  exchange r ate ( wi t h r espect  t o t he US  dol l ar) ,   and ∆i t  t he 
f i r st-order di f f erence of the dom est i c short -term i nt erest rate. The US f ederal funds 
r ate,  i
f
t,   i s t r eated as a str i ctl y  exogenous  r egressor.  
To  t ake i nt o account   pol i cy shif t s ,   part i cularl y t he t i ght ening of  m onet ary pol i cy t hat  
t ook pl ace i n t he f our  count r i es under  i nvest i gat i on i n an att em pt  t o hal t   t he sli de of 9
t he exchange rate duri ng t he cri sis, we  i nt r oduce an int ervent i on dum m y D um 1.  
I nspect i on of the dat a presented in Figures 1-4 suggest s defi ni ng i t  in t he fol l ow i ng 
wa y   i n  each case:
Thai l and: 1  duri ng  t he  A ug97-D ec97  and  Feb98-Jul 98  peri od,   and  0  elsew here.
Kor e a: 1  duri ng  t he  D ec97-M ay98  peri od,   and  0  elsew here. 
I ndonesi a: 1  duri ng  t he  A ug97-Jul 99  peri od,   and  0  elsew here.
Phi l i ppi nes: 1  duri ng  t he  Jul97-O ct 97  peri od,   and  0  elsew here. 
I n t he fi r st stage of t he em pi r i cal analysi s, i t  wa s  f ound t hat  t he i nt erest pari t y
condi t i on hol ds i n t he l ong-run i n bot h I ndonesi a and t he Phi l i ppi nes.   I n t he case of 
Thai l and and Ko r ea,  how ever,   we   det ected t hat   t he i nt erest  pari t y condi t i on hol ds f or 
t he post -cri sis peri od onl y i f  an addit i onal  shif t  in t he m ean is taken int o account .  
These i nt ercept  shif t s are usual l y  i nt erpretable as changes i n  t he  count r y  r i sk prem ium  
( see Ob s t f eld and Rogoff ,   1996),   wh i ch ma i nl y r efl ect  t he m onet ary pol i cy t i ght ening 
i n t he presence of speculati ve at t acks.  Thus,  an addi t i onal  i nt ervent i on dum m y 
( Du m2 )   i s defi ned  t hat   t akes t he  val ue  1  f r om   N ov98  onw ards,   and  0  elsew here i n  t he 
case of  Thai l and,   and  val ue  1  f r om   Feb99  onw ards  and  0  elsew here f or  Ko r ea. 
The  esti ma t ed equi l i bri um   r elati onshi ps  i ncl uded  i n  t he  VECMs   are:
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These relati onshi ps are plausibl e, suggest i ng sharp i ncreases in t he count r y ri sk
prem ia duri ng t he cri sis peri od,  wi t h Indonesi a and the Phi l i ppi nes experi encing t he 
l argest  i ncreases, am ount i ng t o 37%  and 34%  respecti vel y,  com pared w it h around 
5  An   augm ent ed  Di ckey  Ful l er  t est  wa s   carr i ed  out .   Re s ul t s are  avail able  upon  r equest .10
12%  i n t he case of  bot h Ko r ea and Thai l and.   I nt eresti ngl y,   t he esti ma t es also suggest  
t hat   Thai l and  and  Ko r ea enjoy  subst anti all y  l ow er  r i sk prem ia i n  t he  post -cri sis peri od 
t han t hey experi enced pri or  t o t he cri sis.    I n f act  t he r i sk prem ia seem  t o have t urned 
negat i ve overall  in bot h Thai l and and K orea, approxi ma t ely around -4%   and -1%
r especti vel y.
A ssum ing t hat   t he str uct ural  i nnovat i ons are G aussian,  t he condi t i onal   l og-l i kel i hood
( i gnori ng  a const ant  t erm)   i s:
t t t t t L e e
1 ) ( ' 2 / 1 l og 2 / 1
− Γ − Γ − = ( 3)
wh e r eεt  =  ( ε1t, ε2t) ’   i s t he vector  of  str uct ural  i nnovat i ons.   To  expl i cit l y r ecogni ze t he 
existence of condi t i onal  het eroscedasti cit y w e use t he fol l ow i ng G A RCH (1, 1)
specif i cati on f or  t he condi t i onal   vari ance f or  t he  i
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wh e r e the const r aint s γi j ≥ 0 ensure non-negati ve condi t i onal  vari ances, and t he 
condi t i on γi 1  + γi 2 < 1 al l ow s for covari ance stati onary condi t i onal  vari ances. The 
const r ained  i nt ercept  t erms   ( see Ki ng,   Sent ana,  and  W adhw ani ,   1994,   and  No r m andi n 
and  Phaneuf,   1997)  ensure t hat   t he  uncondi t i onal   vari ance of  each i nnovat i on  i s uni t y,  
and,  consequent l y,  that  the i
t h  str uct ural  di sturbance i s hom oscedast i c i f   γi 1  =  γi 2  =  0.  
The  norma l i sati on t o uni t y of  t he uncondi t i onal   vari ances provi des t he t wo   addi t i onal  
r estr i cti ons  necessary  t o  i dent i f y  t he  shif t s i n  t he  slope  coeff i cients.
We  ma x i mi ze the j oi nt  log-l i kel i hood ΣtLt over the param eters of the condi t i onal  
m ean and vari ance equati ons (A,  B( L) ,  δi j ,  wh e r e i, j  = 1, 2 ) by usi ng t he si mp l ex 
algori t hm  i n t he fi r st f ew  it erati ons and t hen t he BFG S al gori t hm .  The Q uasi
Ma x i mu m  Li kel i hood ( see Bol l ersev and W oodl bri dge,   1992)  esti ma t or  wa s   used i n 
order t o obt ain robust  standard err ors, gi ven t he evi dence of non-G aussi an
standardi zed r esidual s. 
6 Thi s m odel  specif i cati on has been found t o be useful  t o descri be t he t i me - varyi ng condi t i onal
vol ati l i t y  of  m any  m acroeconom i c  and  f i nanci al  t i me   seri es  ( see  Bol l ersev,  Chou  and  Kr oner,   1992).  11
5.   Es t i ma t i on  and  Empi rical  Re s ul t s
7
The AI C and Schw arz cri t eri a informa t i on suggest  a V EC M (0) for all  count r i es 
except for Indonesi a, for wh i ch a V EC M (2) w as selected. The esti ma t es of t he 
condi t i onal   m ean and vari ance equat i ons param eters are presented i n Tabl e 1,   wh i ch 
onl y r eport s t he param eters of  i nt erest
8.     As   can be seen f r om  Tabl e 1,   t here i s clear 
evidence of GARCH e f f ects, wi t h t he est i ma t ed param eters of t he condi t i onal
vari ance bei ng signi f i cant,   wh i ch support s t he i dent i f i cati on schem e proposed i n t hi s 
paper.   Fur t hermo r e,  t he  sum  of  t he  esti ma t ed param eters i n  t he  condi t i onal   vari ance of 
t he dom est i c int erest rate is less than uni t y,  wi t h t he excepti on of the Phi l i ppi nes
9.
Consequent l y,   f or  t hi s count r y we   specif y an I nt egrated GARCH  ( I GARCH)   m odel ,  
by  i m posi ng γi 1+ γi 2  =  1 ( wh e r e i   =  1, 2),   f or  t he corr espondi ng condi t i onal   vari ance 
equat i ons.
10 Fi nal l y,  the di agnost i cs presented in Tabl e 2 are sati sfactory,  wi t h t he 
excepti on of  Thai l and and Ko r ea,  f or  wh i ch som e autocorr elati on i n t he standardi zed 
r esidual s is detected by t he Lj ung-Box st ati sti c. The s t andard err ors (and
corr espondi ng t -rati os) presented in Tabl e 1 for Thai l and and K orea are therefore 
corr ected f or  t he  presence of  r esidual   autocorr el ati on.
The r esult s report ed in Tabl e 1 confi r m t he presence of coint egrati on,  as the err or 
corr ecti on coeff i cient,  α2,  is found t o be negat i ve and st ati sti call y si gni f i cant in t he 
esti ma t ed int erest r ate equati ons.  They also suggest  t hat  t here w as a signi f i cant
m onet ary  pol i cy cont r acti on  duri ng  t urbul ent  peri ods,   since t he  sum  of  t he  coeff i cients 
β21and β21D  i s negat i ve i n all   cases,  and β21D  i s hi ghl y signi f i cant.   Thi s confi r ms   t hat  
i n each of the four count r i es there w as a contem poraneous increase of the dom est i c 
i nt erest  r ate i n  r esponse  t o  exchange r ate depreciati on  duri ng  t he  cri sis peri od.  
Tabl e 1 also cont ains cl ear evidence of a nom i nal  exchange rate appreciati on i n
r esponse  t o  a dom est i c i nt erest  r ate i ncrease duri ng  t r anqui l   peri ods.     Thi s i s i ndi cated
7  The  em pir i cal  analysi s has  been  carr i ed  usi ng  t he  RATS  soft wa r e.
8  We   do  not   r eport   t he  coeff i cients on  t he  speed  of  adjust me n t   coeff i cient  i n  t he  exchange  r ate  equat i on,  
on  t he  l ags  and  t he  US  f ederal  f unds  r ate.
9  As   poi nt ed out   by  Bol l erslev,  Chou  and  Kr oner  ( 1992),   t he  evidence  of  persistence i n  t he  condi t i onal  
vari ance  i s a  com m on  f i ndi ng  i n  mu c h   of  t he  em pir i cal  l i t erature  usi ng  f i nanci al  dat a.
10 The presence of IG A R C H , as show n by Sent ana and Fiorent i ni  (2001),  d oes not  aff ect t he
i dent i f i cati on  of  t he  system .  I n  t hi s case,  t he  authors ( op.   cit . )   suggest   t o  r estr i ct  t he  const ant  part   of  t he 12
by  t he  coeff i cient  β12,   wh i ch i s f ound t o be posi t i ve i n all   f our  count r i es.  I n cont r ast,  
duri ng t urbul ent peri ods t he nom i nal  exchange rate appears to depreciate sharpl y i n 
r esponse t o ri ses in t he dom est i c pol i cy rate.  T his is evidenced by t he sum  of the 
coeff i cientsβ12 and β12D ,   wh i ch i s clearl y negat i ve.     No t e t hat   β12D   i s mu c h   l arger  i n 
absolut e t erms   t han β12 and t hat  it  is highl y si gni f i cant in al l  four cases, suggest i ng 
t hat  the eff ects of m onet ary pol i cy ti ght ening on t he exchange rate duri ng t urbul ent 
peri ods we r e not   onl y opposi t e t o t hose duri ng t r anqui l   peri ods,   but   also subst anti all y 
l arger.
6. C oncl usi ons
Thi s paper  has exam ined t he eff ects of  a m onet ary pol i cy t i ght ening on t he exchange 
r ates duri ng t he recent As i an cri sis. A dvocat es of the “revisioni st vi ew ”, such as 
St i gl i t z (1999),  in a part i al equi l i bri um  m odel ,  and G ert l er et al.  (2000) in a general 
equi l i bri um  f r am ew ork,   em phasi ze t he perverse eff ect  of  an i ncrease i n t he dom est i c 
i nt erest  r ates on  t he  dom est i c curr ency,  ow i ng  t o  a hi gher  probabi l i t y  of  bankrupt cy of 
hi ghl y l everaged corporati ons.  Ou r  em pir i cal r esult s are consistent wi t h t he
convent i onal   vi ew  i n t he sense t hat   we   f i nd t hat   m onet ary pol i cy t i ght ening l eads t o a 
nom i nal  exchange rate appreciati on duri ng t r anquil  peri ods.   Ho we v e r ,  t hey al so 
provi de support  t o t he “revisioni st” view  in t hat  t hey very cl earl y show  t hat  t he 
t i ght ening of m onet ary pol i cy that  occurr ed duri ng t he A si an fi nanci al cri sis w as 
excessive.   By  goi ng  beyond  wh a t   wa s   r equi r ed t o  off set  i ncreasing  r i sk prem ia,  t i ght er 
m onet ary pol i cy appears to have cont r i but ed to t he col l apse of the exchange rates 
wh e n   t hey  cam e under  speculati ve  att ack. 
Ou r   em pir i cal  f i ndi ngs are r obust   i n t he sense t hat   we   have t aken care t o address t wo  
f undam ent al  econom et r i c probl em s t hat   have pl agued t he em pir i cal  l i t erature on t hi s 
i m port ant  pol i cy i ssue.    Fi r st,   we   have t aken i nt o account   t he simu l t aneous f eedback 
bet w een exchange rates and int erest rates by specif yi ng a V ECM  m odel  and by
ut i l i sing an appropri ate i dent i f i cati on procedure due t o Sent ana and Fi orenti ni   ( 1999),  
wh i ch exploi t s the presence of het eroscedasti cit y i n t he t i me  s e r i es under
i nvest i gat i on.   Second,  w e have consi dered a longer ti me  p e r i od t han ot her studi es, 
wh i ch f ocus  on  t he  cri sis peri od  onl y.     Thi s has  enabled us  t o  com pare t he  r elati onshi p 
condi t i onal  vari ance to uni t y.   Furt hermo r e, t he result s do not  change if  w e adopt  an IGARCH 13
bet w een exchange rates and int erest rates duri ng t r anqui l  peri ods w i t h t hat  duri ng 
mo r e t urbul ent  peri ods.  
specif i cati on  f or  t he  ot her  count r i es  as  we l l .  14
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                                                                                              Tabl e 1:  Es t i ma t i on  result s
Thai l and K orea Indonesi aP h i l i ppi nes








β12   0. 10
( 1. 85)














β21   0. 07
( 2. 73)














γ11   0. 60
( 6. 48)






γ12   0. 36
( 4. 39)






γ21   0. 84
( 20. 15)






γ22   0. 13
  (3.08)





No t e:  T- r ati os  ( adjust ed  f or  t he  presence  of  r esidual   corr elati on)    are  i n  parentheses.    I n  t he  Phi l i ppi nes,  
t he  condi t i onal   vari ance  f or  t he  i nt erest  r ate  equat i on    has  been  m odel l ed  as  an  I GARCH,   as  t he  sum  of
γ21and γ22  had  previousl y  been  f ound  t o  exceed  uni t y.
Tabl e 2:  Di agnosti c t ests on  t he  residual s
Thai l and K orea Indonesi aP h i l i ppi nes
LB1( 10) 0. 06 0. 01 0. 58 0. 34
LB2( 10) 0. 36 0. 33 0. 09 0. 39
LB
2
1( 10) 0. 61 0. 31 0. 10 0. 18
LB
2
2( 10) 0. 80 0. 78 0. 08 0. 77
Ep-St at 1 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
Ep-St at 2 0. 14 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00
No t e:  The  di agnost i cs are com put ed f or  t he  standardi zed r esidual s εi   ( wh e r e,  i   =  1, 2).   LB  i s t he p-val ue
of  t he  Lj ung-Box  t est  f or  t he  nul l   of  no  autocorr elati on  against   t he  alt ernat i ve  of  autocorr elati on  up  t o
order  20 f or  t he standardi zed r esidual s.  LB
2  i s sam e t est  f or  t he  squared standardi sed r esidual s.  Ep- St at
i s the p- val ue for the norma l i t y t est on t he residual s (see D oorni k,  Ha n s e n ,  1994).  The subscri pt  i 
( wh e r e,  i   =  1, 2)  denot es  t he  i
t h  equat i on  of  t he  VECM.17
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